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Abstract Recent studies now provide a relatively robust
explanation of how moral behavior evolved, perhaps not
just in humans. An analysis of current biology textbooks
shows that they fail to address this critical topic fully. Here,
I survey resources—books, images, and videos—that can
guide educators in meeting the challenge of teaching the
biology of morality.
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I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers who
maintain that of all the differences between man and
the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by
far the most important.
—Charles Darwin, Descent of Man
Study of the biology of morality has expanded substantially
in recent decades—and it is still growing. Research has
highlighted the social structure and cooperative behavior in
insects, primates, and other animals, from vampire bats to
meerkats and naked mole rats. They have analyzed human
economic choices of costly helping and selfishness in many
cultures and modeled games of cooperation, defection,
punishment, and group choice. Anthropologists have studied
political organization and norms in hunter-gatherers and other
isolated cultures, while neurophysiologists have engaged new
imaging technologies to identify areas of the brain active in
various forms of moral thinking. The ultra-reductionism and
implicit promotion of competition that once dominated the
field (for example, E.O.Wilson’s Sociobiology and On Human
Nature, and Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene) have, along
with the rhetoric of the Cold War, yielded to more balanced
perspectives and more nuanced interpretations. Scientific
understanding of morality as an evolved form of behavior is
now fairly robust.
Given the intellectual, cultural, and political importance
of the nature of morality, a scientific perspective on the
origin of moral behavior seems essential for a full,
humanistic understanding of evolution. Evolution education
is thus not just about interpreting patterns in fossils,
mastering principles of natural selection, or appreciating
some unifying theme in biology. Nor is it just about
profiling the “nature of science” more effectively. It is also
critically about conveying an understanding of who we are
as moral beings in the context of our organic history. No
introductory biology course can be considered complete
without addressing the evolution of morality (Allchin
2009a). Yet, as profiled here, current textbook coverage is
generally incomplete and tends to exhibit an outmoded
reductionistic bias. To help remedy this deficit and foster
better understanding among educators, I review here a
number of books available to the general reader. These
books provide general background knowledge for teachers
and supplement a new textbook insert for students which
profiles the basic concepts (Allchin 2009b).
Current Status of Teaching Evolution of Morality
What is currently taught about evolution of morality in
biology courses? For a rough-hewn (but hopefully suffi-
ciently conservative) analysis, I surveyed a sample of major
textbooks in the US market for several benchmark concepts
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(Table 1).1 The texts were targeted at various levels:
introductory college (both biology majors and non-majors)
and secondary (high school) students.
Despite modest differences (due to author emphasis and
style), there is a widespread consensus2 about what is
relevant to address. Informative patterns are present:
1. All texts address animal behavior, including social
behavior. (Not so for textbooks several decades ago—
and this surely reflects the tremendous expansion of
research and deepening of knowledge in this area.)
There is surely a context for addressing the biology of
morality.
2. All texts address the innate/learned distinction, although
they rarely extend it explicitly to the structure of human
culture or, more particularly, to morality.
3. Nearly all acknowledge “altruism” among animals as
an evolutionary puzzle and provide some sort of
explanation. At the same time, most are not clear
whether they intend such explanations to be relevant to
interpreting human altruism: for example, where mental
intent may be relevant (Sober and Wilson 1998).
4. Reductionistic bias varies, but the texts basically omit
the concept of emergent properties or new levels of
organization at the psychological and social levels
(Holland 1998; Camazine et al. 2001; Richerson and
Boyd 2005; Murphy and Brown 2007). They do not
describe how social rewards or sanctions can regulate
“selfish” behavior or individual “cheating”—for exam-
ple, as observed in food sharing among vampire bats
(Wilkinson 1984, 1990). All texts generally present a
genetic explanation for cooperative or “altruistic”
behavior, while also referring in some way (elsewhere)
to cultural evolution. Yet, they fail to reconcile the
apparent conflicts inherent in these alternative views.
The bias is further reflected in the near-universal
consideration of kin selection (Hamilton 1964) coupled
with widespread neglect of reciprocity (Trivers 1971),
although the scientific literature over the past several
decades typically treats the concepts in tandem (c.f.,
Krebs and Davies 1993; Nowak 2006).
5. College texts, not surprisingly, provide more depth than
high school texts. At the same time, non-majors texts
are more consistent than majors texts in profiling
cultural evolution, or the status of human society in
an evolutionary context. “Why is this material deemed
less relevant for those pursuing a biology degree?” one
may wonder.
6. Cautions about interpreting human behavior in the
context of non-human, apparently “natural” examples,
are relatively quite rare. There are no mentions of
“Social Darwinism,” its flaws and misleading impres-
sions, or its status as an ideology not supported by
evolutionary science (Allchin 2007a, b).
In summary, there seems to be a substantive deficit in what
is being taught compared to what is currently known about
the biology of morality—and what has been known for at
least the past seven years (roughly two cycles for revising
textbook editions)—even though much information is
already available in popular formats.
Prospects: A Survey of Books
Many books on the evolution of morality are now available
for the general reader. Some excel in describing the science,
others in profiling the limits and cultural context of the
science. A few books (by science popularizers or journalists)
are less fully informed and, given their potential to mislead
readers or to reinforce cultural ideologies, should be marked
for receiving a more critical posture.
Perhaps the most approachable book, lucid and personable,
is The Origins of Virtue (1996), by science writer Matt Ridley.
He explains: “Our minds have been built by selfish genes, but
they have been built to be social, trustworthy and cooperative.
This is the paradox this book has tried to explain.” It is an
excellent guide to how scientists solve the central puzzle
(setting aside the author’s brief anti-government tirade in the
final chapter). Comments about the scientists and their
research further enrich understanding of the nature of science.
Another prime overview is Evolutionary Origins of
Morality (2000), edited by Leonard Katz. This volume has
hefty papers by primatologist Frans de Waal, anthropologist
Christopher Boehm, philosopher-biologist duo Elliott Sober
and David Sloan Wilson, and games-theorist Brian Skyrms,
each summarizing their books (further profiled below). In
addition to providing a healthy cross-disciplinary mix, the
volume has ten commentaries on each primary paper,
profiling an informative spectrum of interpretive perspec-
tives. This book complements the earlier Biology of
Morality (1978), edited by Gunther Stent, which, while the
information is dated and incomplete, still serves as an
effective overview of the interdisciplinary landscape.
1 This is not intended as an evaluative assessment of any specific text
identified here, either as whole text or with respect to this specific
topic. Rather, the relevant information is at the level of the ensemble
of texts. Reflecting the aim to assess the “market,” the reviewed books
were the “leading” textbook from each publisher who exhibited at the
2008 meeting of the (US) National Association of Biology Teachers
(as identified by each publisher’s representative). Although proper
sales statistics are not available, the texts by Campbell and Reece and
by Miller and Levine are generally recognized anecdotally by
publishing industry professionals and teachers as having the largest
(indeed, dominant) market share.
2 Convergence of textbooks is not uncommon in a competitive market.
The coincidence of publication dates, for example, reflects synchro-
nized cycles of edition revision.
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Frans de Waal’s work is presented more fully in Good
Natured: The Origin of Right and Wrong in Primates
and Other Animals (1996). It is filled with vivid—and
instructive—anecdotes of primate behavior, especially well
suited for classrooms with a non-academic tone. De Waal
focuses thematically on features that contribute to a fully
developed moral system: sympathy, rank and order, quid
pro quo (tit for tat), and getting along (such as reconciliation),
elements that he brings together in a final commentary. In
The Ape and the Sushi Master (2001), he expands his focus
to address features of primate and animal culture, aiming to
erode assumptions that dichotomize nature and (exclusively
human) culture. Later, in Primates and Philosophers (2006),
de Waal returns to interdisciplinary discourse, taking
issue in particular with the notion that human morality is
only a thin “veneer” covering a selfish core. He emphasizes
the deeply embedded (primate) emotions of empathy,
consolation, reciprocity, and fairness. (The contributions
from his commentators—Philip Kitcher, Peter Singer,
Christine Korsgaard, and Robert Wright—however, are
not deeply informative.)
Krebs and Davies’ An Introduction to Behavioral
Ecology (1993) is an advanced text that is now partly dated
conceptually but is still valuable in summarizing many
concrete examples.
In Hierarchy in the Forest (1999), Christopher Boehm
analyses egalitarian societies and the links between moral-
ity and political organization. He compares modern humans
with their ancestors and closest primate relatives. Boehm
claims that under appropriate conditions, “a large, ad hoc,
community-wide political coalition serves as watchdog
over individual behaviors that could lead to victimization
of others, or to conflict within the group” (Katz 2000,
p. 80). He profiles the politics of chimps, hunter-gatherers,
tribesmen, and other hominoids and surveys the preadapta-
tions that empower moral communities, such as effective























Campbell et al. (2008) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Russell et al. (2008)a ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Sadava et al. (2008) ✔ ✔ ✔
Solomon et al. (2008) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Starr et al. (2009)b ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Non-majors
Alters and Alters (2006)c ✔ ✔
Audesirk et al. (2008)d ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Cain et al. (2009) ✔ ✔ ✔? ?
Hoefnagels (2009)e ✔ ✔ ✔
Mader (2009)f ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Pruitt and Underwood (2006) ✔ ✔ ✔
Secondary
BSCS (2006) ✔ ✔ ✔?
De Salle and Heithaus (2008)g ✔ ✔ ✔
Postlethwait and Hopson (2009) ✔ ✔
Miller and Levine (2008) ✔ ✔
a Presents child abuse in reconstituted human families as biological
b Emphasizes reproductive success; chapter opens with “My Pheremones Made Me Do It” about honeybees, followed by section on “How Genes
Affect Behavior”
c Emphasizes reproductive fitness; profiles evolutionary psychology; characterizes social behavior as “a form of communication”
d Emphasizes individual cases more than concepts
e Opens chapter with examples of risk-taking helping behavior
f Opens with case of naked mole rats to frame questions
g Emphasizes reproductive success; characterizes cooperation as mutual selfishness
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communication skills. He also underscores the role of the
early human social environment in shaping further biological
evolution. This highlights the importance of understanding
levels of organization in biology—the genetic, the organis-
mal, the psychological, and the social—and how they
interact, with regulation from the “top-down” as much as
by development from the “bottom-up.” The framework of
cultural evolution (along with its potential for shaping
biological traits) is also addressed extensively in Peter
Richerson and Richard Boyd’s Not By Genes Alone (2005).
They sketch how behavior can be transmitted culturally,
highlighting the ability to mimic, or copy, in lieu of learning
individually. At the same time, they appeal broadly (and
often uncritically) to diffuse group selection, emphasizing in-
group cohesion and out-group conflict in shaping behavior.
The distinction between levels of organization and their
relevance for moral behavior is also explored in Sober and
Wilson’s Do Unto Others (1998). They distinguish, in par-
ticular, evolutionary altruism (at the genetic level) and
psychological altruism (at a mental, intentional level). They,
too, support the notion of group selection but without fully
considering the role of social selection and sanctioning, which
have become more prominent since they published their book.
A major area of investigation has been simulations of
various evolutionary strategies to determine which are
stable. Cheaters can disrupt a system of cooperators, for
example, proliferate, and ultimately replace the cooperators.
Brian Skyrms presents the results of many such models in
The Evolution of the Social Contract (1996). His work
echoes the landmark 1984 Evolution of Cooperation, by
Robert Axelrod. These works might be useful in inspiring
students with computer programming skills to set up some
simple simulations of their own. Alternatively, a creative
teacher might find in them an occasion to develop student
activities wherein students play games in successive rounds
based on choosing to “cooperate” or “defect.” Such
activities might provide first-hand experience exploring
various factors or assumptions, such as the ability to
“punish” non-cooperators or to opt out of the system
(Novak 2006; Güreck et al. 2006; Hauert et al. 2007).
The modern reader will still find much of value in
Darwin’s original Descent of Man (1871). Darwin’s theory
of the origin of the moral sense, or the feeling of duty to help
one’s fellows (Chapter 3), drew on four elements: (1) social
instincts, a product of a social species able to provide
mutual benefit; (2) memory, a foundation for reflection,
remorse, and conscience; (3) language, allowing each
organism to communicate its needs more effectively; and
(4) habit, the product of learning, which will generate
immediate, unreflective responses. Darwin’s work has many
flaws by modern standards. Yet some comments also seem
remarkably prescient—for example, his hesitant specula-
tions about group selection, considerations of punishment,
or the role of social selection in fitness. It is fascinating to
see how Darwin articulated the first informed approach to
morality from the unique perspective of natural history.
In his “sequel” work, The Expression of Emotions
(1872), Darwin delved more fully into the roots of the
third element, communication, namely, how did organisms
exhibit externally their internal emotions in such a way that
others could respond to them, even without language?
Darwin considered body postures and the muscles involved
in various facial expressions, noting, for example, how their
opposite extremes were associated with contrary emotions.
His work drew in part on studies by Ernest Duchenne, who
photographed subjects when specific muscles had been
activated with electrodes. It is a landmark work in showing
how mental states may be investigating physiologically—
still accessible and provocative to the general reader.
Readers with deeper historical interests may consult
Robert Richards’ authoritative (and award-winning) Darwin
and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and
Behavior (1987), which profiles developments in psychology,
including moral thinking, in the nineteenth century. (The
volume is valuable mostly for historians, in tracing Darwin’s
thinking, rather than for educators, who may be looking for a
prospective conceptual trajectory that might engage modern
students, say.) Richards’ history of science is extended into
the history of philosophy in Biology and the Foundations of
Ethics (1999), edited by Jane Maienschein and Michael Ruse.
The contributors are all distinguished scholars, but the
volume as a whole is not well unified.
Readers with strong philosophical interests may be
especially concerned about evolutionary interpretations of
intention, agency, or free will (at the psychological level).
These are addressed in several books, none yet synoptic or
comprehensive, however—or simple. In The Evolution of
Agency and Other Essays (2001), Kim Sterelny addresses
the problem of intention. He argues, first, that there was an
important shift from neural systems that respond to single
stimuli to those that integrate multiple environmental cues.
He then articulates the role of preference, emerging from
behavioral plasticity (afforded by learning). The result:
desires, in organisms that can truly represent their environ-
ment internally (and not “merely” respond to it). Bruce
Waller looks at the implications for moral philosophy in
The Natural Selection of Autonomy (1998). He claims that
we share the domain of autonomy and morality with other
animals and that doing so requires major revisions in our
conceptions of moral objectivity and moral responsibility.
In The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency (1998),
William Roffschaffer likewise uses evolutionary knowledge
to reassess the philosophical concept of moral agency,
leading to a multi-leveled approach reflecting evolutionary
history. Educators take note: these three books are not for
the philosophically squeamish.
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A final set of books earn mention because they help
frame the limits of evolutionary approaches to morality and
culture. They are mostly cautionary in tone. For example,
many persons imagine that evolution might ultimately
resolve the question of “human nature” or what moral
principles “really” are (or should be). A healthy check is
provided both by Paul Farber’s The Temptations of
Evolutionary Ethics (1994) and by Michael Bradie’s The
Secret Chain (1994). Each discusses how trying to justify
particular human values from the facts of evolution fails.
Farber’s book is more historical, Bradie’s more philosoph-
ical. Both underscore the problem of naturalizing cultural
ideologies—that is, ascribing one’s own cultural beliefs to
nature. Richard Joyce echoes similar sentiments in The
Evolution of Morality (2006), using more philosophical
prose (and correspondingly less biological rigor); he
concludes, characteristically, “we should reject or modify
any theory that would render us epistemic slaves to the
baby-bearing capacities of our ancestors” (p. 219).
One may note the absence of books about sociobiology
cited here. While these books inspired much research, their
relevance is now limited, especially in interpreting human
morality, as opposed to animal sociality or cooperation
based on kin selection. Genetic explanations typically fall
short in explaining psychological or social-level phenom-
ena fully. The sociobiology fad is instructive historically,
however. The episode illustrates the power of persistent but
misleading assumptions about biological determinism. The
errors of this doctrine are profiled, along with their political
context, in Richard Lewontin’s Biology as Ideology (1993),
Stephen Rose’s Lifelines: Life Beyond the Gene (1997), and
earlier in Not in Our Genes (1984), co-authored by these
two and Leon Kamin.
Caution may extend also to the current wave of
evolutionary psychology. Robert Richardson’s Evolutionary
Psychology as Maladapted Psychology (2007) is a good
overview of the methodological problems that generate
many hasty, unjustified claims. Considerable attention has
also been devoted to the nineteenth century case of Phineas
Gage, who lost a large section of his brain in a railway
repair accident but survived, albeit with dramatically altered
moral behavior. His case is examined in depth by Malcolm
Macmillan in An Odd Kind of Fame: Stories of Phineas
Gage (2000). Macmillan shows how the facts of the case
have been repeatedly refashioned and reinterpreted, some-
times in contradictory ways, to fit different scientific ideals.
Ultimately, few claims fit with what little is documented
historically (including recent high-profile claims by neuro-
physiologist Antonio Damasio). The report by the original
attending physician, John Harlow, is reproduced for reference.
Ultimately, the case presents a fascinating and sobering lesson
about the role of preconceptions in science and the potential
for error—valuable for understanding, and teaching about, the
nature of science (Allchin 1995, 2008). We are well advised
to think critically and skeptically when biologists address
culture.
Finally, readers eager to venture deeper into the recent
scientific literature may consult the online text by Allchin
(2009a) and its bibliography. Recent sources may be needed
especially for addressing findings in neurophysiology, shift-
ing views on the roles of reason versus emotion, and debates
about intentionality and deception in non-human animals. Not
addressed here are other possibly relevant books on child
psychology (moral development), social psychology, eco-
nomic decision-making, or the general theme of emergence,
systems theory, and anti-reductionism.
Books to Avoid
Ideally, one may like to imagine that everything written on
the topic of evolution and morality is informative. Alas, the
seductive drama of the subject has attracted many authors
not well qualified, either biologically or philosophically(!).
Blind enthusiasm for sociobiology and pop evolutionary
psychology has spawned many books that play on plausibility
but are uncritical and misleading. Sadly, then, I alert readers to
a few books that are widely encountered but earn negative
recognition.
Perhaps the most disturbing is The Moral Animal (1994),
by Robert Wright, who offers the credentials of a journalist,
although based on the book’s claims one might surmise a
rather ambitious one. Human behavior is largely reduced to
competition and career moves. There is no sensitivity to social
context (as in Boehm’s book, say). The overall “message” is
not much different from the discredited doctrines of Herbert
Spencer, warmed over with modern jargon.
Nancy Etcoff’s Survival of the Prettiest (1999), ironically
subtitled The Science of Beauty, is also grossly misleading.
It is a confused melange that tries to portray as instinct a
will to seduction, a desire to be sexy, and universal norms
of attractiveness. Add to this a dash of feminism and an
implicit stigma for those perceived as ugly, and you have
quite a fine example of culturally tainted pseudoscience.
Those wishing a primer on sexual or social selection will
be better rewarded reading Volume 2 of Darwin’s Descent
of Man.
Jared Diamond’s The Third Chimpanzee also exhibits
overt cultural bias, promoting such unwarranted surmises as
expensive dates being about reproductive fitness.
Several authors succumb to the temptations that Farber
cautions against. Larry Arnhart in Darwinian Natural Right
attempts to claim that biological universals are “natural”
and, therefore, desirable and even justified. However,
frequency does not indicate value. The same error appears
in Michael McCullough’s Beyond Revenge (2008), al-
though it includes informative social psychology, outside
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an evolutionary context. Many essays in Evolutionary
Ethics and Contemporary Biology (2006; edited by Boniolo
Giovanni and Gabriele De Anna) also suffer from such
aspirations as well. In Created from Animals: The Moral
Implications of Darwinism (1990), James Rachels suggests
that our moral duties are shaped by our relationship to
other species, as shown by evolution. His claims are
provocative and warrant consideration. However, the
claim is really founded on an assumed value of kinship,
not the facts of Darwinism. Keeping such distinctions clear
is important, and the casual uncritical reader may easily slip
into error.
Prospects: Images and Videos
As noted earlier, the basic concepts have been described
and structured for classroom use in a textbook-style essay,
“The Evolution of Morality” (Allchin 2009b). However,
for modern classroom presentations, visuals also seem
essential. Images have been collected in an online image bank
(Allchin 2009c), cleared for copyright permission in educa-
tional contexts: http://EvolutionOfMorality.net/images/. The
images are organized by theme, key concept, and content,
such as “moral systems (sociality and communication) |
network reciprocity | vampire bats.” Each image comes with
two instructional captions: one didactic, one for inquiry-
mode teaching. The images are also integrated into a
complete text for student use, as well as organized in a
web-browser-based image-only presentation for classroom
instruction.
Videos are also helpful in presenting samples of relevant
behavior. Online samples relevant to the evolution of
morality have been listed at (Allchin 2009d): http://
EvolutionOfMorality.net/videos.htm. This includes, for ex-
ample, links to videos of the 1996 case at Chicago’s
Brookfield Zoo of a gorilla (Bintijua) handling a child that
had fallen into its enclosure and a similar incident at the
Jersey Zoo in England. Others are observational data from
recent scientific research.
Prospects: Strategies
The challenge for teachers, ultimately, is to distill and
organize all this information—and present it simply and
coherently for students. The problem seems amplified by
contrasting approaches to morality among philosophers:
consequentialism, on the one hand, and deontology, on the
other (at least). A framework incorporating these contrasts
in a biological context was presented earlier (Allchin 1999,
2006) has recently been updated. The approach is based on
first clarifying the different levels of biological explanations
and the philosophical traditions whose concepts are closely
allied with each:
Behavior Moral Philosophy Biological Science
Moral acts Consequentialism Instinct and behavioral
genetics
Moral motives or intent Deontology Psychology and
neurophysiology
Moral systems Social contract Sociality and
communication
Within this framework, one may articulate the basic
biological concepts, such as inclusive fitness and kin
selection; reciprocity; neurological structure and function;
open behavioral programs, learning, and behavioral plas-
ticity; tragedy of the commons; emergence; sanctions and
strong reciprocity; network reciprocity; and image scoring
(reputation) and indirect reciprocity. The threefold structure
helps distinguish the different levels of causality for these
concepts—genetic/evolutionary, psychological, and social—
and shows how their effects must be integrated.
In the nineteenth century, Darwin could only speculate
about and sketch the evolution of moral acts, moral
feelings, and moral systems. Now, however, we have a
wealth of studies of human, primate, and other animal
behavior, and of neurophysiology and Paleolithic cultures
that are all coalescing into robust explanations about our
heritage as moral organisms. Now, on the occasion of
Darwin’s bicentennial, we are ready to teach a deeper
understanding of the biology of morality.
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